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Kristofer Schipper has been a towering influence on the study of Daoism and 
Chinese religion over the past five decades, but, besides his well-known Daoist Body1 and his 
monumental Handbook to the Daoist Canon2, the rest of his published work has been dispersed 
in obscure and hard-to-find publications. La religion de la Chine is a collection of some of his 
seminal articles originally published between 1979 and 2006, preceded by a new, 83-page 
synthetic essay on the origin of China’s “living religion.”  The articles are ordered roughly in 
historical progression, so that the book covers the entire span of China’s religious history, 
until the present and even into the future. Taken as a whole, the collection offers a good 
overview of Schipper’s views on Daoism and Chinese religion and society, which continue to 
be debated by scholars today. After a brief discussion of the main argument of the book, for 
the benefit of non-Francophone and non-specialist readers this review will elaborate on the 
points made in some of the key chapters in the book, and end with a consideration of the 
significance of Schipper’s ideas for the study of Chinese religion and Chinese studies.  
 La religion de la Chine proposes an alternative narrative of Chinese history, society and 
civilization – one which is grounded in Daoism and the religion of the Chinese people. The 
dominant narrative of China, centred around its enlightened administrators and its rational 
state, and which sees China’s history as, in essence, the unfolding of this civilizing process 
from ancient times until today, is the work of the “Confucian” class of literati, whose heirs 
are the intellectuals, reformers and Party leaders of the modern era, and whose prejudices 
have been transmitted, since Matteo Ricci, to the China scholars of the West. All share a 
visceral disdain for, and profound ignorance of the life and culture of the common people – 
known in the past as the habits of the “stupid people” 愚民, recently as the backward 
superstition 迷信 of the peasants, or, today, in more positive light, as quaint “ folk customs” 
民俗 or unorganized “popular faith” 民間信仰. For Schipper, however, the true civilization 
of China is to be found among the people. Though ignored if not actively suppressed by 
scholars and officials, it is organized, it is structured, it is integrated, it has lived 
uninterrupted from ancient times to this day, and its core is Daoism. 
                                                
1 Kristofer Schipper, The Taoist Body, trans. Karen Duval. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993.  
2 Kristofer Schipper and Franciscus Verellen, eds. The Taoist Canon: A Historical 
Companion to the Daozang. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.  
 The alternative narrative of this civilization, constructed by Schipper in La religion de la 
Chine recounts how, in the Zhou and Han periods, the split was consummated between what 
is now known as “Confucianism” and “Daoism” – not merely as two competing 
philosophical schools, but as two systems of socio-political and clerical organization – the 
former finally becoming the ideology and ritual system of the imperial state and its 
bureaucracy, the latter providing the liturgical framework for structuring local communities 
through their local associations devoted to the cult of saints and deities. While the former is 
a top-down hierarchy which radiates from the centre, the latter is a dense fabric of horizontal, 
rhizomatic networks of self-governing, quasi-democratic associations. The centrifugal 
dynamic generated by the fierce autonomy of these local cults and communities is countered 
by the unifying dynamic of Daoist ritual and cosmology, which subdues and integrates local 
gods into its pantheon. Daoist priests act as intermediaries between local forces and 
universal principles, while Daoist saints and ritual operate as symbolic mediators between the 
imperial state and local society. Thus, where the imperial state and its mandarins rarely 
penetrated deep into the villages and neighbourhoods of traditional China, it was Daoism 
which provided the symbolic and social unity of Chinese civilization, among the myriads of 
localities within the realm and even extending beyond, into borderland minority areas and 
the Chinese diasporic communities of Southeast Asia and elsewhere. While the dominant 
narrative of the history of China’s modernization in the 20th century typically recounts the 
struggles around the rejection of Confucianism and the adoption of Western thought, this 
represents, in fact, a mere change of ideological clothes of China’s intellectual and governing 
elite, which only replicated its disdain for the other, “Daoist” China, and gave it the tools for 
its wholesale destruction. And yet, after a century of campaigns and restrictions, the religion 
of the Chinese people is still a “living tradition”, whether in the Peoples’ Republic, in Taiwan 
and Southeast Asia, or even in the restaurants and temples of Chinese communities in 
Europe and North America.  
In the first chapter of La religion de la Chine, which is the longest of the book, 
Schipper attempts to sketch the genesis of this “living religion,” in the period leading up to 
the later Han, as well as the orthodox reaction to it, and the processes by which the two 
currents became separated. The turning point seems to have been when the rites and history 
of the aristocracy were codified into texts, probably around the beginning of the Western 
Zhou (771-221). The Five Classics 五經 became the reference for rites and the art of 
government, for what became the “public religion” of the Confucians. In these works, 
mythology, epopees, stories of local gods and cults were not recorded. It was, instead, what 
Schipper calls an emerging “religion des mystères,” an initiatory cult analogous to the 
contemporary movements in the Mediterranean region, which transmitted that lore through 
the Shanhaijing 山海經, the Zhuangzi 莊子 and other texts. These texts are replete with 
references to real and mythical places, to gods associated with these places, with discussions 
on immortality and death. The figures who appear in the Zhuangzi are literati and artisans, 
farmers and slaves, men and women: this mystery movement was composed of people from 
all backgrounds and places; it ignored social rank, and its concerns revolved around the 
purpose of life and death. Its masters, the fangshi 方士, were initiated artisans, like the 
butchers and carpenters who feature prominently in the Zhuangzi.  
During the Spring and Autumn period of the late Zhou, it was at the Jixia academy 
稷下學宮 of Qi, which took the Yellow Emperor, Huangdi 黃帝, as its ancestor, and which 
Schipper compares to the intellectual ferment and freedom of ancient Athens, that this 
nebulous mystery cult coalesced into the more fully-formed Huanglao 黃老 school. Through 
contacts with the nearly cult of Master Anqi 安期生  near present-day Qingdao, the 
cosmology of the Mysteries combined with local deity cults and developed the notion that 
access to immortality and divinization was potentially accessible to anyone and even to any 
being. The individual initiate, through his alignment with Dao, acquires powerful virtues; 
when he displays charity and uses his powers to aid the common people, he becomes an 
object of worship, a popular saint, and a god. Thus, the individual self-cultivation of the 
Daoist mystic is organically linked to the communal local deity cults of Chinese religion.   
While the Huanglao school was a key foundation of the sacred regime of the Qin 
and Anterior Han, it was resisted by the orthodox literati, who gained the upper hand during 
the reign of Emperor Wu 漢武帝 (140-87 BC), who created a new academy to collect the 
Classics, established a new cult to Heaven, and, under the hand of Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒, 
invented new rituals. The Huanglao arts were called “Daojia” 道家 by Sima Qian 司馬遷 
and others, giving a new label to the stigmatised knowledge.  
Rejected at court, the Daoist tradition returned to the people, and became the 
organized voice of popular resistance and hopes. It was out of this tradition that Chinese 
millenialism emerged. It first appeared in the Taipingjing 太平經 of 33 BC, followed by the 
Xiwangmu 西王母 millenarian cult and the Wang Mang 王莽 revolution, all of which took 
inspiration from the Mystery religion of initiations and immortality. After the Han 
restoration, the state was even more strongly committed to classical orthodoxy, owing to its 
fear of revolutions and revolts. Although the state’s attitude later relaxed, the popular 
millenarianism continued and erupted with the Way of Heavenly Masters 天師道 in 142 and 
the Taipingdao 太平道 in 166, which led to the fall of the Han in 220.  
The repression of the Heavenly Masters caused the movement to disperse and 
spread to North China; by 300, it seems to have reached the rural population and aristocracy 
all the North. Then, it spread South after the invasion of 317. The ritual system of the 
Heavenly Masters aimed to aid not only humans, but gods as well, in their progression 
towards immortality, allowing the priests to integrate local deity cults into their pantheon and 
liturgy. A new compilation of authentic texts in 437 by Lu Xiujing 陸修静 did not include 
the Confucian classics. This was the beginning of the Daoist Canon, “signaling the divorce 
between Daoism and Confucianism” (p. 95)  
Schipper further develops some of these points in chapter 2, “Millenialisms and 
messianisms in ancient China,” in which he discusses the role of Daoism in the spread of 
Buddhism in China. Indeed, the first aspect of Buddhism to become popular was the fusion 
of Buddhist eschatology with Daoist millenialism; under Daoist influence, the expectation of 
Maitreya – which, in Indian Buddhism, was foreseen as aeons away --   came to be seen as 
imminent. The Maitreya cult was most popular during the mediaeval period (3rd and 4th cent.), 
and became the main vehicle for millenial fervour. At the same time, it diminished in 
Daoism, which became more institutionalized in different polities. The Buddhist apocalyptic 
sutras were never admitted into orthodoxy, however; millenial groups were repressed, and 
finally assimilated to “White Lotus” heresies.  
The subsequent chapters focus on different aspects of the role of Daoism in the 
structuration of local society and religion. Chapter 3, “The covenant of purity in Daoism,” 
argues that the qingyue 清約 institution in the Heavenly Masters movement had the effect of 
transforming the structure of communal religion, shifting power from priests to lay 
assemblies. By this covenant, gods refuse animal sacrifice and priests cannot be paid a salary. 
Instead, it is the community – the hui 會 – which receives funds and offerings. This meant 
that priests could not live on their ritual services full-time, and needed to find other 
employment; on the other hand, the hui (originally the zhi 治) obtained a permanent source 
of income; they thus became free associations based on members’ contributions, managing 
their own funds and assets, only using part of them to pay fees to priests when needed, on a 
contractual basis. Over time, the institution of the hui (in some places called gongsi 公司, or 
“common management”) became a vehicle for the collective ownership of a significant 
portion of China’s wealth. At the same time, it was the organized assembly, rather than 
individual clerics, which became responsible for the collective salvation of the community. 
Thus, through the institution of the qingyue of the Heavenly Masters, we can trace the origins 
of what Schipper has often called the “local democracy” of traditional Chinese hui, in which 
it is lay assemblies which, formed to ensure the communal cult with the assistance of Daoist 
priests, also govern local community affairs.   
Chapter 9, on “Royal lords and plague gods,” through an ethnographic study of a jiao 
醮  communal ritual in Xigang (Taiwan), examines how the event is constituted and 
interpreted by local assembly chiefs, Daoist masters and the populace, each of which play 
complementary roles and give it different meanings. The next chapter, a study of the fenxiang 
分香 networks of the Baosheng dadi 保生大帝 cult in Taiwan, uncovers the significance of 
these networks of hundreds of temples, spanning several regions, channeling economic, 
cultural and political exchanges. Clearly, this is not some unorganized folk religion of 
illiterate peasants, but a highly organized institution, which continues to live after 800 years, 
and has left monumental traces. The Baosheng dadi cult provides a structure for a variety of 
groups which may be more or less interested in religion, trade, education, common surname 
or origin. What they all have in common is the desire to “belong and participate in a circuit 
of communication and cooperation.” (296).  
The canonization of Baosheng dadi by the Emperor in 1165, as for so many other 
gods, gave imperial status and official rank to the saint (which could be exercised in his name 
by local elites), creating a powerful rallying point for local interests, in effect creating and 
legitimising a kind of autonomous kingdom under each god. But these “kingdoms,” though 
they are each rooted in different regions of Fujian, are not strictly territorial: rather than 
creating territorial boundaries, they create networks extending outward from their home 
territory. Furthermore, fenxiang networks are not hierarchical; each temple remains 
independent. Fenxiang networks span and cross administrative boundaries, permitting 
horizontal links and negotiations between jurisdictions, which are impossible according to 
centralized hierarchies.  
Chapter 13, on “Liturgical structures and civil society in Peking”, draws on 
epigraphic materials and surveys written in the republican period to consider the role in 
urban social life of this religious system. There were at least 1000 temples in Peking at the 
beginning of the 20th century, and several hundred guild halls which were also temples. Each 
temple had at least one association, if not several and even, for the main temples, dozens. 
The Dongyuemiao 東岳廟 had several associations using it; it was “the headquarter of the 
city’s associations”. This fabric of organizations integrated the entire population. The 
associations governed much of city life -- some guilds were more powerful than the state, 
collecting obligatory contributions which were actually taxes. Associations and their temples 
also played a judicial role, and provided training, social services, and funerals for their 
members, and were cultural centres, providing venues for theatre, chess, and martial arts 
clubs. The basis of this civil society was its religious foundation. Many associations, in their 
documents, mention only their religious side without a hint of their professional guild 
dimension. The saints which these associations worshipped were officially canonized. Their 
cult of the canonized saint gave them cover and legitimacy. Through the cult, they were 
recognizing the emperor’s authority. The Confucians hated this, but the arrangement 
allowed for the integration of  the state and commercial elites. By canonizing saints, the 
emperor coopted them into his own cult.  
 The fabric of this “civil society” was destroyed by the modernizing “convert temples to 
schools” movement launched at the turn of the 20th century, discussed in chapter 14, which 
caused not only the annihilation of Chinese religion, but the destruction of their social life 
and of everything that had meaning for the Chinese. The Daoist Canon itself was almost lost 
in the destruction; it was only thanks to a reprint by the Commercial Press, purchased by 
university libraries, that saved it from oblivion and made possible the emergence of Daoist 
studies, which have, in Schipper’s words, saved Daoism from extinction (chapter 15). In the 
final chapter, on the “gene bank of culture”, Schipper makes a case for the importance of 
the slow and painstaking work of research in the humanities, which amounts to preserving 
the cultural gene bank of the species, and which goes against the drive for short-term 
productivity in contemporary academia. It is from the interbreeding of the “genes” of 
different cultures, in space or in time, which gives birth to new civilizations.   
 Much of the material in La religion de la Chine is now well known in the field of Daoist 
studies; other points remain speculative or debatable. As in the seminars he formerly gave at 
the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Schipper deploys his textual mastery and his 
unparallelled experience of field research to offer far-ranging and often daring insights on 
the broad sweep of Chinese history, with an infectious passion for Daoism. Besides the 
many nuggets and inspiring questions for debate or future research which the reader will find 
in this book, most significant is the alternative, Daoist-centred narrative of Chinese history 
and society which is constructed by the book, and which Schipper has been elaborating and 
promoting throughout his career.  
 The past few decades of scholarship in the history and anthropology of Chinese 
religion have completely overturned the old narrative of a China devoid of religion, in which 
a rational, enlightened elite of scholars and philosophers guided the superstitious and 
ignorant masses. The centrality of religion to Chinese history and society, and increasingly 
sophisticated models of the structure and dynamics of Chinese religion, are now established 
facts in the field of Chinese religious studies and anthropology – even if they still remain 
largely ignored in many other fields of Chinese studies. But the centrality of Daoism to the 
religious dimension of Chinese culture, is still far from being a widely accepted proposition. 
This is partly due to contested definitions of Daoism itself -- with Schipper sometimes 
claiming, in oral comments, that all or most of Chinese religion should be subsumed under 
Daoism, just as Indian religion is called “Hinduism”--and partly due to historians’ and 
anthropologists’ lack of training in Daoist ritual and history, making it difficult for them to 
perceive Daoist structures and continuities. The alternative narrative of China presented in 
La religion de la Chine is thus a fresh challenge for our understanding of Chinese religion – 
and, even more so, of Chinese history, politics and civilization as a whole. It deserves to be 
considered and debated by scholars in all fields of Chinese studies.  
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